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(we can not determine when, everything is dependent on many circumstances)

This is the second part of the conference on the causal process of mind without ipseity: Shown in this conference the importance and specific connection in the development of the understanding of a mind that is a causal process without ipseity.

DEPARTMENT OF RESEARCH FOUNDATION 'S MAS i MANJON

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Presentation.

This is the second part of the conference on the causal process of mind without ipseity: Shown in this conference the importance and specific connection in the development of the understanding of a mind that is a causal process without ipseity.

In this second conference, responding to questions of relevant interest in reference to the causal process of mind without ipesidad.

Questions from the audience

Answers the research director of the Foundation

Second conference dialogue.

Q. Can you explain the difference between the mental process and consciousness?

A. The answer inevitably is extensive , so I'll try to synthesize and summarize .

The mental process is causal , so it is a causal mental process , a continuous flow of causes and consequences. This causal process has varying degrees , these degrees conceptually designate them as Consciousness .

Consciousness is a different degree of this mental process causal obviously consists of many different factors.

Consciousness can determine which is the causal mental process without ipseity , in a specific grade , and that we designate as degree is the product or products of it.

The causal mental process, it is self-regulating, there is something to support it.

In antiquity had mistakenly believing abstract and diffuse this consciousness, it was something external.

The mind with ipseity (The way archaically thought), is an abstraction that conceptually, it has adapted

different conceptions throughout history, but always maintained that conceptuality abstract and diffuse, very difficult to understand and study in a wide range of experiences with a sense rationalist.

Understanding a causal mental process without ipseity (The present way we observe the process), includes the ability to experiment without diffuse abstractions.

Through an experiment with which we can access to observe this causal process.

So, we know that consciousness is a product of this process of causal mind without ipseity.

Q. But as we can see this mental process causal, who observes?

A. The answer is that the causal mental process is a process that flows into what we might designate a conceptual way, as packets of information that are grouped into coherent subsets, being independent of each other but establishing coherence of unity. This enables that can be observed without the causal process is interfered.

Q. Then the causal mental process is self organized, but how it organizes itself?

A. It is a process that is still a long way to go, so we can understand the many possibilities causal consistency, but if we can eventually say, that the coherence of self is always changing and fluid.

Although the process is causal, it supports random probabilities, and therefore requires constantly reorganize, it would explain the profound changes in the mental process from the beginning of life to the end of it.

Q. Can you explain the relationship of conscious or unconscious about the causal process of mind without selfhood?

A. What has been designated as a conscious or unconscious, are products (conceptually) the causal process of mind while determining the causal

process organizes distributing all the factors that form, causing different degrees of expression or perception.

These different degrees by increasing or decreasing variation, cause what we call it as conscious or unconscious.

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